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International Arbitration & ADR Newsletter May 2026

Date and time :2026-05-28
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International Organization for Mediation Successfully Resolves First International Maritime Dispute

On May 8, 2026, the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed) hosted its inaugural Global Mediation Summit in Hong Kong, drawing over 400 representatives from multiple countries and regions. John Lee, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, emphasized in his speech that Hong Kong is dedicated to developing into a global mediation center. At the summit, Teresa Cheng, Secretary-General of the IOMed, announced a major milestone: the organization had successfully mediated its first international maritime dispute involving a charterparty contract chain in early May, marking a breakthrough for Hong Kong's maritime law and dispute resolution services.

The case involved parties from the Chinese mainland and Singapore, with a Hong Kong international maritime lawyer serving as the mediator, ultimately facilitating a written settlement agreement that completely resolved the dispute across the entire contract chain. The success of this case not only highlights the high efficiency and value of mediation in handling complex maritime disputes, but also demonstrates the openness of IOMed's services—its mediation services are not limited to joint founding states, parties from non-signatory states (such as Singapore) can equally utilize them. It is understood that the mediation procedure can be initiated either by a joint application from both parties or by a unilateral "offer to mediate." The entire process fully respects the parties' autonomy and is characterized by confidentiality and its "without prejudice" nature.

The IOMed is committed to building a global mediation ecosystem, encouraging all parties to prioritize mediation mechanisms when facing disputes. Currently, the Secretariat of the IOMed is actively exploring the establishment of a specialized panel of mediators for commodity market disputes with relevant stakeholders, aiming to promote the IOMed as the preferred mechanism for resolving

 international commodity disputes.


Ireland Faces First ICSID Arbitration, UK Energy Company Seeks €120 Million Under ECT

On May 11, 2026, UK-listed energy company Lansdowne Oil & Gas PLC issued an announcement confirming that its investment arbitration against the Irish government has been officially registered by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). This marks the first-ever ICSID arbitration claim encountered by Ireland in its history.

The dispute in this case centers on the exploration rights in the Barryroe oil and gas field located in the Celtic Sea, Ireland. In 2022, the Irish government terminated the exploration license long held by Lansdowne on the grounds of "failure to fully fulfill exploration obligations." However, Lansdowne pointed out that the substance of this move was to advance Ireland's policy goal of "phasing out fossil fuel exploration and development by 2030," a statutory target enacted under its Climate Action (Amendment) Act of 2021.

Lansdowne initiated the arbitration pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), alleging that the Irish government's actions constitute unlawful expropriation (Article 13) and a breach of fair and equitable treatment (Article 10, Paragraph 1). The arbitral tribunal in this case will be constituted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Lansdowne is seeking a total compensation of approximately €120 million to cover its upfront exploration investments, losses of expected development revenue, as well as related interest and procedural costs. The clash between environmental policy and investment protection in this case is expected to draw widespread attention within the international arbitration community.


French Court of Cassation Issues Two Conflicting Rulings on Arbitral Jurisdiction over Dual-Nationality Investors

On May 6, 2026, the French Court of Cassation rendered two diametrically opposed decisions regarding jurisdictional disputes in investment arbitrations involving dual-nationality investors (individuals holding both French citizenship and the nationality of another state). In the case involving Vietnam, the court set aside the lower court's decision and remanded the matter for retrial; conversely, in the case involving Venezuela, the court upheld the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction. The simultaneous rendering of these judgments in parallel cases on the same day directly reflects a theoretical schism within the French Court of Cassation regarding the treaty standing of dual-nationality investors.

The treaty standing of dual-nationality investors has long been a gray area in international investment arbitration, and French courts previously lacked clear case law guidance on the matter. Within academic and practitioner circles, those in favor of extending protection argue, based on the "principle of effective interpretation" under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that treaty provisions should be interpreted in a manner that facilitates relief. Conversely, opponents vigorously emphasize that a "real and effective link" must exist between the investor and the state of nationality for jurisdiction to be established.

These two contrasting rulings highlight that a unified jurisprudential consensus has yet to be reached even at the level of the French apex court. This judicial uncertainty indicates that the jurisdictional controversy surrounding dual-nationality investors is far from settled; looking ahead, further clarification and definitive resolution will highly likely be required from higher-level bodies, such as the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) or ICSID ad hoc committees.


Xinyang Intermediate People's Court:

Arbitral Award Set Aside upon Re-examination as Tribunal's Failure to Present Judgment and Allow Applicant's Cross-Examination Constitutes Procedural Violation

Legal Basis:

"Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China"

Article 58


A party may apply for setting aside an arbitration award to the intermediate people's court in the place where the arbitration commission is located if he can produce evidence which proves that the arbitration award involves one of the following circumstances:

(1) There is no arbitration agreement;

(2) The matters decided in the award exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement or are beyond the arbitral authority of the arbitration commission;

(3) The formation of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration procedure was not in conformity with the statutory procedure;

(4) The evidence on which the award is based was forged;

(5) The other party has withheld the evidence which is sufficient to affect the impartiality of the arbitration; or

(6) The arbitrators have committed embezzlement, accepted bribes or done malpractices for personal benefits or perverted the law in the arbitration of the case.

The people's court shall rule to set aside the arbitration award if a collegial panel formed by the people's court verifies upon examination that the award involves one of the circumstances set forth in the preceding paragraph.

If the people's court determines that the arbitration award violates the public interest, it shall rule to set aside the award.


Case Description:

Since July 2017, the applicant and the respondent had been entangled in a dispute over the settlement of project payments under a Colored Aluminum Doors and Windows Fabrication and Installation Contract. The core of their disagreement is centered around the recognition of material changes during the construction process and the final unit price of the project. Due to the prolonged delay in resolution, the applicant lawfully initiated arbitration before the Xinyang Arbitration Commission. On September 24, 2024, the arbitral tribunal rendered the arbitral award (2024) Xin Zhong Cai Zi No. 125. In this proceeding, the tribunal did not accept the settlement arguments submitted by the applicant. Instead, it directly introduced a judgment from an entirely separate case in which neither party to the present case had participated—namely, the Civil Judgment (2021) Yu Min Zai No. 122 issued by the High People's Court of Henan Province. Relying solely on the Project Settlement Review and Approval Opinion confirmed in that external judgment as the exclusive basis for determining the unit price in this case, the tribunal substantially reduced the total contract price of the project and ultimately ruled that the respondent was only required to pay a remaining balance of RMB 10,009.37 along with relevant interest.

On February 26, 2025, the Xinyang Intermediate People's Court issued a civil ruling (2025) Yu 15 Min Te No. 1 in response to the applicant's application to set aside the arbitral award. At this stage, the applicant argued that the arbitration proceedings were plagued by serious statutory violations concerning the designation of arbitrators, the application of sole-arbitrator expedited procedures, and the cross-examination of evidence. However, upon review, the original court held that the evidence submitted by the applicant was insufficient to fully prove that the arbitral award involved any statutory grounds for setting aside an award under Article 58 of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, and thus lawfully dismissed the applicant's application. While this ruling took effect immediately upon issuance, it failed to substantively resolve the procedural dispute between the parties.

Some time after the original civil ruling took effect in 2025, the case took a decisive turn. During an internal discussion and case review, the Adjudication Committee of the Xinyang Intermediate People's Court determined that the effective civil ruling (2025) Yu 15 Min Te No. 1 was indeed erroneous and decided to form a new collegial bench to initiate re-examination proceedings in accordance with the law. During the public hearing of the re-examination, the applicant heavily supplemented and emphasized the procedural defects of the arbitral tribunal in adopting the decisive evidence, explicitly pointing out that when the tribunal used the external judgment as the basis for its decision, it neither presented the document during the hearing nor organized any cross-examination, completely depriving the applicant of its statutory litigation rights.


Court's View:

In its re-examination review, the Xinyang Intermediate People's Court conducted a comprehensive assessment of the case strictly pursuant to the provisions of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China and relevant judicial interpretations. The Court explicitly pointed out that under the mandatory provisions of Article 45 of the Arbitration Law, evidence must be presented during the hearing and subjected to full cross-examination by the parties. Meanwhile, relevant judicial interpretations clearly define a "violation of statutory procedures" as a circumstance that violates the arbitration procedures prescribed by the Arbitration Law or the arbitration rules chosen by the parties, and where such a violation may affect the correct determination of the case. Safeguarding the parties' right to cross-examination constitutes an inviolable bottom line for ensuring the fairness of arbitration proceedings and ascertaining the objective facts of a case.

During the specific factual verification phase, the re-examination collegial bench lawfully reviewed the entire arbitration file and carefully verified the details with the original arbitrator. The review conclusively demonstrated that throughout the entire arbitration proceeding, the arbitral tribunal had indeed never organized any form of cross-examination regarding the Civil Judgment (2021) Yu Min Zai No. 122, which served as the core basis for its decision. The Court stressed that neither the applicant nor the respondent in the present case was a party to the said Case No. 122, meaning that the content of this external judgment constituted entirely un-confronted evidence as far as the parties to this case were concerned.

Based on the aforementioned ascertained facts, the Xinyang Intermediate People's Court delivered its final evaluation. The Court held that when the arbitral tribunal directly adopted an external effective judgment as a highly disadvantageous basis against the applicant, it neither presented the document during the trial nor afforded the applicant any opportunity to voice cross-examination opinions on the evidence. Such a method of determining a case constituted a severe violation of statutory procedures, directly infringed upon the parties' due process rights, and inevitably compromised the fair adjudication of the case. Accordingly, the Court lawfully determined that the arbitral award fully met the criteria for setting aside an award under Article 58, Paragraph 1, Item (3) of the Arbitration Law due to "arbitration procedures violating statutory procedures." It ultimately ruled to set aside the court's original civil ruling and lawfully set aside the arbitral award rendered by the Xinyang Arbitration Commission.


Swiss Supreme Court Rules International Sanctions Constitute Statutory Deferral of Debt Under Civil Law, Denying Enforcement of LCIA Award


Case Description:

In 2023, Company A, an Angolan company primarily engaged in diamond and mineral exploration and trade, prevailed in an arbitration initiated against the respondent, Mr. B, before the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). The LCIA successively rendered a partial final award on February 2 and a final award on costs on April 28 of that year, directing Mr. B to pay Company A legal costs totaling CHF 368,207.06. As Mr. B failed to voluntarily comply with the award obligations, Company A applied for and successfully obtained an asset attachment order from the District Court of Aarau in the Canton of Aargau, Switzerland. It subsequently initiated formal enforcement proceedings against Mr. B, applying to the local court for enforcement relief regarding the arbitral award (i.e., a definitive lifting of opposition / definitive Rechtsöffnung).

In the ensuing enforcement proceedings, the respondent, Mr. B, raised a formal objection, asserting that Company A should be deemed a sanctioned entity pursuant to the Ordinance on Measures connected with the Situation in Ukraine (the "Ukraine Ordinance") enacted by the Swiss Federal Council on March 4, 2022. Upon review, the High Court of the Canton of Aargau found that although Russian Company C—which was placed on the sanctions list—held only a 41% stake in Company A, the fact that Company A's board of directors included multiple Russian nationals and its core financial and production management positions were occupied by representatives of Company C demonstrated that Company A was effectively under the absolute control of a sanctioned entity. Accordingly, the cantonal High Court ruled that the payment ban resulting from the sanctions constituted a "subsequent objective impossibility of performance" under Article 119, Paragraph 1 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, and that the debt in question had been extinguished by operation of mandatory law, thereby denying Company A's application for enforcement relief. Discontented with this judgment, Company A filed an appeal with the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in accordance with the law.


Court's View:

On March 13, 2026, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court rendered its final judgment on the matter. Although the Supreme Court ultimately dismissed Company A's appeal, it employed the judicial technique of "substitution of reasons" (Motivsubstitution) in its legal reasoning, making a major, jurisprudentially significant correction to the underlying logic of the cantonal High Court. Regarding factual determinations, the Supreme Court fully upheld the finding that Company A qualified as a sanctioned entity, explicitly stating that the assessment of "control" must not be restricted to a rigid mathematical analysis of ownership stakes. Given the specific background of Company A's board and the fact that key financing agreements were executed by representatives of sanctions-linked parties, the cantonal High Court's comprehensive determination that Company A was controlled by a sanctioned entity fell well within its reasonable scope of discretion and was free from any manifest error or arbitrariness.

On the level of legal application and characterization of efficacy, the Supreme Court particularly emphasized the overriding mandatory nature of the Ukraine Ordinance as an "overriding mandatory rule" (Eingriffsnormen) under Swiss law. The Court pointed out that regardless of whether the underlying debt relationship was originally governed by English law or Swiss law, as long as a party seeks enforcement through state coercive power within Swiss territory, it must unconditionally comply with Swiss public policy and sanctions prohibitions. Permitting the forced execution of the arbitral award via state authority would directly cross the fundamental red line in the sanctions ordinance that strictly prohibits making economic resources available to listed persons.

In what constitutes the most groundbreaking determination of legal consequences in this case, the Supreme Court explicitly overturned the cantonal High Court's arbitrary ruling regarding the "extinguishment of debt." Analyzing the matter deeply, the Supreme Court noted that international sanctions are inherently foreign policy instruments that fluctuate alongside geopolitical developments; they are non-permanent impediments rather than absolute, permanent impossibilities of performance. Simply holding that a debt is extinguished during the sanctions period would result in the creditor completely losing its right of recourse even after the sanctions are lifted in the future, which severely violates the principle of equity in private law. Consequently, the Supreme Court creatively recharacterized the legal effect of the sanctions’ prohibition as a "statutory deferral" (gesetzliche Stundung). During the period in which sanctions remain in force, the law mandatorily grants the debtor a right to defer performance, placing the subject debt into a dormant state of being "unenforceable." Based on this statutory deferral, the claim currently lacks "maturity for enforcement" (Fälligkeit) and thus fails to satisfy the statutory requirements for granting enforcement relief. This jurisprudential correction not only legally blocks the current enforcement proceedings but also naturally exempts the debtor from default interest during the sanctions period and interrupts the statute of limitations as a matter of law.